始于2008  原始点差  不加佣金。
十七年信誉保障
零起付:0.01美元返佣也可以支付到账。
随时付:随时提现,无周期或次数限制。
免费付:不扣任何手续费,全额到账。
2015-04-14 15:46:25
Colin Twiggs,2014.12.3
一些读者表达了关于对商品价格下降(尤其是原油价格)是否会导致通货紧缩的担心。这种担心混淆了原因和表象。 除了由货币紧缩导致的价格下降之外,大部分的价格下降都是良性的。当供大于求时,商品价格就可能下降,但是这会很快被消费者消费行为的改变而吸收。就储蓄而言,可自由支配收入上升,所以总的需求是不受影响的。
然而,货币供给紧缩导致的价格下降影响更为严重。基础货币供给数量的缓慢增加(低于实际GDP增长)导致更少的钱买同样的商品,使价格下降。这种情况下供需是不变的,但是货币紧缩导致了价格的下降。然而,工资是不会随着价格的下降而下降的,公司盈利减少,裁员,产出降低。低就业率、低收入导致总需求收缩,导致企业进一步降低产出。
货币紧缩同时也给银行的借贷带来压力。这种危险性Irving Fisher在20世纪30年代就已经明确表达了出来。信贷收缩不仅降低了新的投资行为,也会迫使现有的借贷者清算他们的一部分资产,主要是股票以及房产。抛售的激增以及信贷的有限性导致了资产价格的降低。银行的借贷随着资产价格降低进一步收缩,最终产生循环效应——价格进一步下降。这就是央行的“完美风暴”。下图显示了2009年我们距离通货紧缩螺旋是多么的近。 2009年,基础货币的缓慢上升导致银行借贷的急速收缩(零以下)。美联储迅速采取的措施成功避免了金融市场再次陷入1930s的危机。美联储在10月表明它将会通过削减QE以及不再扩大自己的资产负责表的方式来支持货币供给量的增长。2008年的货币紧缩会再次到来吗?
答案是:不会。下图中美联储的资产负债表,我们能看到红色的总资产上升缓慢。但是银行在美联储的储蓄——超额准备金,每年利率在0.25%——增长更加缓慢。这意味着流入银行系统的实际资金没有减少,而是在增加。 下图显示了净增长率大于20%(总资产减去超额准备金存款)。预期它将随着时间的推移增速放缓,但是美联储可以调整超额准备金的存款利率来保证它大于0. 对于欧元来说,通货紧缩的是一个更大的问题。在2012年“尽一切努力”拯救之后,欧央行又过早的收缩其资产负债表——在病人完全康复之前放弃治疗。与美联储一样,它们也没有足够多的可以缓解通缩影响的超额存款准备金。 结果是经济增长摇摇欲坠,价格水平下降到接近通缩的危险水平。 欧央行似乎意识到了它的错误,它表明会在需要的时候扩展资产负债以避免货币紧缩。如果它已经从过去的错误中吸取教训,那么它能够避免通货紧缩的任何威胁。
Will falling commodity prices caus
e deflation? By Colin Twiggs December 3rd, 2014 1:00 a.m. ET (5:00 p:m AEDT)
Some readers expressed concern about falling commodity prices, especially crude oil, and whether this will cause global deflation. This confuses the cause with the symptom. Falling prices are largely benign except where caused by a contraction of the money supply. Commodity prices may fall when there is an excess of supply over demand, but this is soon absorbed by changes in consumer behavior. Discretionary spending will rise in response to the savings, so that aggregate demand is unaffected. A contraction in the money supply, however, is far more serious. Slow growth in the monetary base (below growth of real GDP) results in less money chasing the same goods, driving down prices. Supply and demand in this case are unchanged, but prices fall because of a contraction in the money supply. Wages, however, are sticky and do not fall in line with prices, leading to falling profits, cuts in production and job layoffs. Falling income from lower profits and fewer jobs leads to a contraction in aggregate demand, causing further cuts to production and income. Contraction of the money supply also places pressure on banks to reduce lending. This danger was highlighted by Irving Fisher in the 1930s. Contracting credit reduces not only new investment but forces existing borrowers to liquidate some of their assets, mainly stocks and property. The surge of selling, and limited availability of credit, drives down asset prices. A feedback loop results, with falling asset prices prompting banks to further contract lending — in turn causing more price falls. That is the central bankers' equivalent of a perfect storm. The graph below shows how close we came in 2009 to a deflationary spiral. Slow growth in the monetary base caused a sharp contraction in bank lending (below zero) in 2009. Only prompt action by the Fed averted a 1930's-style collapse of the financial system. The Fed indicated in October that it will curtail QE and no longer expand its balance sheet to support money supply growth. Should we expect another contraction of the money supply as in 2008? The answer is: NO. When we look at the graph of the Fed balance sheet below, we can see that total asset growth [red] is slowing. But bank deposits at the Fed — excess reserves that earn interest at 0.25% p.a. — are slowing at an even faster rate. That means that the actual amount of money flowing into the banking system is not contracting, but increasing. The following graph shows a net growth rate (of Total Assets minus Excess Reserves on Deposit) of more than 20 percent. Expect growth to slow over time, but the Fed can adjust the interest rate payable on excess reserves to ensure that it remains positive. Deflation is a far bigger problem for the Euro. After a "whatever it takes" surge in 2012, the ECB attempted to contract its balance sheet far too soon — withdrawing treatment before the patient had fully recovered. They also do not have excess reserves on deposit, like the Fed, which could soften the impact. The result has been faltering economic growth and price levels falling dangerously close to deflation. The ECB appears to have recognized its error, indicating that it will expand its balance sheet if necessary to avert a monetary contraction. If they learn from their past mistakes, the ECB should be able to avoid any threat of deflation.
本文翻译由兄弟财经提供
文章来源:http://tradingdiary.incrediblecharts.com/2014-12-03-economy.php
兄弟财经是全球历史最悠久,信誉最好的外汇返佣代理。多年来兄弟财经兢兢业业,稳定发展,获得了全球各地投资者的青睐与信任。历经十余年的积淀,打造了我们在业内良好的品牌信誉。
本文所含内容及观点仅为一般信息,并无任何意图被视为买卖任何货币或差价合约的建议或请求。文中所含内容及观点均可能在不被通知的情况下更改。本文并未考 虑任何特定用户的特定投资目标、财务状况和需求。任何引用历史价格波动或价位水平的信息均基于我们的分析,并不表示或证明此类波动或价位水平有可能在未来 重新发生。本文所载信息之来源虽被认为可靠,但作者不保证它的准确性和完整性,同时作者也不对任何可能因参考本文内容及观点而产生的任何直接或间接的损失承担责任。
外汇和其他产品保证金交易存在高风险,不适合所有投资者。亏损可能超出您的账户注资。增大杠杆意味着增加风险。在决定交易外汇之前,您需仔细考虑您的财务目标、经验水平和风险承受能力。文中所含任何意见、新闻、研究、分析、报价或其他信息等都仅 作与本文所含主题相关的一般类信息.
同时, 兄弟财经不提供任何投资、法律或税务的建议。您需向合适的顾问征询所有关于投资、法律或税务方面的事宜。
《通向财务自由之路》的作者范K·撒普博士指出:交易成本是影响交易绩效的重要因素之一。很少有交易系统可以创造比它的成本更高的利润。通过外汇返佣代理开户,可以大幅有效的降低交易成本,从而提升获利潜能、改善交易绩效。
风险提示:
金融产品保证金交易存在极高的风险,未必适合所有的投资者,请不要相信任何高额投资收益的诱导而贸然投资! 在您决定投资杠杆类金融产品时,请务必考虑您的经验水平和风险承受能力,投资导致的损失有可能超过存入的资金,因此您不应该以不能承受损失的资金来投资!投资风险不仅来自于杠杆交易,也有可能来自于交易商, 请仔细甄选合规的交易商以规避风险!所有投资者的交易帐户应仅限本人使用,不应交予第三方操作,任何由接受第三方喊单、操盘等服务而导致的风险和亏损应自己承担,责任自负!
兄弟财经是一间独立的咨询服务公司,不隶属于任何交易商,仅向投资者提供信息咨询、降低投资成本的咨询类服务。 兄弟财经不邀约客户投资任何杠杆类的金融产品,不接触投资者资金及账户信息,不提供交易建议,不提供操盘服务,不推荐交易商, 投资者自行选择交易商,兄弟财经仅提供信息咨询,交易商的任何行为均与兄弟财经无关!
投资者在兄弟财经进行任何咨询行为均代表接受和认可上述声明!
所有投资者均为自行选择且直接前往交易商官网进行投资行为(包括提交开户资料和存取资金),兄弟财经不承担客户与交易商之间的交易争议及由交易商问题造成经济损失的责任。 如果您不了解杠杆类金融产品市场的风险,请千万不要参与相关投资交易!
请确保您具备以下条件:专业级的投资知识与能力;可以承受损失的资本(亏损不会导致负债或影响生活)。否则切勿参与杠杆交易。