Russ Koesterich 2015年8月29日
大多数经济学家和投资者明白在2008年危机之后美国消费者需要一段时间来修复其严重超支的资产负债表。但是在信贷泡沫破裂七年后，事情变化也不是很大。即使就业增长迅速且油价大幅下跌，消费者的反映不是很剧烈。
虽然经济衰退在2009年就已经结束，美国真实家庭消费仍低于历史平均水平。在1947到2007的60年间，家庭消费平均每年增长3.6%。到2008年，下降到大约1.5%。即使排除经济衰退，平均水平仍然仅在2.3%左右。
这个下降一部分是测量问题。在一个服务驱动的共享消费中，测量经济变得更加困难。也就是说，很难反驳一些已经改变的事实。
事实上，正如我在最新的《市场观点》报纸上写到的：“消费的放缓早于经济危机。事实上，美国家庭面临的挑战是几个长期趋势，不会很快消失。”
一个这样的趋势：工资停滞不前。在经济衰退之前，就业和工资增长之间有一个非常一致和显著的关系。然而，由于经济危机，这种关系似乎破灭了。
尽管美国劳动力市场没有太萧条，但是我们也没有发现工资的大幅度上涨。这可能因为在当前复苏期间的许多新工作的工资都较低或者是兼职的。换句话说，虽然经济逻辑表明工资应该和工作一起上涨，机构性力量正在改变劳动力市场的组成，包括技术的进步和人口的老龄化，可能会抑制工资增长回到二战后的水平。
当然，消费可以脱离收入。毕竟，收入增长的不利因素持续了几十年，产生了家庭怎么管理资金维持2008年危机前消费增长的问题。
这种现象的背后有许多因素：双职工家庭的增加，储蓄率的下降，政府转移支出的巨大上升和几十年来的家庭信贷扩张。但是这些因素似乎不再推动消费。
例如，职业女性的增加使许多家庭转移了工资停滞不增长的影响。不幸的是，这种趋势似乎已经结束。2000年到2014年，女性劳动力市场参与率从59%下降到56%，而且几乎没有恢复的迹象。
同时，虽然储蓄率已经从上个年代的低谷反弹，仍低于历史平均水平并且很可能因为老龄化人口的退休金需求需要进一步上升。
同时，考虑到政府将会面临不断增加的人口老龄化的负担，转移支付增加消费的趋势可能不能持续。最后，考虑到消费者的债务占可支配收入水平还是很高，普通的美国家庭不太可能回到金融危机前的借贷习惯。
展望未来，这种变化意味着消费很可能保持低迷，至少和二战后相比是这样的。作为回应，市场的一部分可能是脆弱的：美国消费类股票表现比大盘好已经很多年了。他们的良好表现可能因为美国消费者不能回到过的荣耀时难以维持。
What’s Holding Back the U.S. Consumer
By Russ Koesterich | August 29, 2015
Most economists and investors understood that it was going to take some time for U.S. consumers to repair their overextended balance sheets after the 2008 crisis. But seven years after the bursting of the credit bubble, things haven’t changed much. Even as job growth has surged and gasoline prices have plunged, consumers are proving slow to respond.
Since the recession ended in 2009, U.S. real household consumption has remained well below the historical average. In the 60 years between 1947 and 2007, real household consumption grew annually by an average of 3.6 percent. Since 2008, it has been closer to 1.5 percent. Even if you exclude the recession, the average is still only around 2.3 percent.
The decline is partly a function of a measurement problem. In a service-driven, “sharing” economy, measuring consumption has become more difficult. That said, it’s hard to argue with the fact that something has changed.
In fact, as I write in my new Market Perspectives paper, “The Hangover: The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Consumer,” the slowdown in consumption predates the crisis. Indeed, the challenges facing U.S. households are tied to several secular trends that won’t be going away anytime soon.
One such trend: stagnating wages. Prior to the recession, there was a very consistent and statistically significant relationship between job creation and wage growth. However, since the financial crisis, that relationship seems to have broken down.
Though there likely isn’t much slack left in the U.S. labor market, we haven’t seen an accompanying broad pickup in wages. This may be because many of the new jobs in the current recovery are low paying or part time. In other words while economic logic suggests that wages should accelerate along with jobs, structural forces changing the makeup of the labor market—including advances in technology and an aging population—may inhibit wage growth from reverting back to the post-WWII norm.
Of course, spending can and does deviate from income. After all, stagnant income growth has been a persistent headwind for several decades, raising the question of how households managed to fund a fairly consistent period of rising consumption before the 2008 crisis.
There were a number of factors behind this phenomenon: the rise of the two-income family, a declining savings rate, a significant rise in government transfer payments and a multi-decade expansion in household credit. But these factors no longer appear to be tailwinds to consumption.
For instance, the rise of women in the workforce enabled many households to deflect the impact of stagnant real wage growth. Unfortunately, this rise seems to have run its course. Between 2000 and 2014, female labor market participation declined to 56 percent from 59 percent, and there are few signs of its imminent recovery.
Meanwhile, though the savings rate has rebounded from last decade’s lows, it remains well below the historical average and likely has further to rise given an aging population that needs to fund a longer retirement.
At the same time, given the increasing burden that an aging population will place on the federal government, the trend of transfer payments flattering consumption probably isn’t sustainable. Finally, it’s unlikely that the typical U.S. family can return to its pre-crisis borrowing habits, considering that consumer debt-to-disposable income levels are still relatively high from a historical perspective.
Looking forward, this changing landscape means consumption is likely to remain modest, at least as compared to the post-WWII norm. In response, one segment of the market may prove vulnerable: U.S. consumer stocks, which have been outperforming the broader market for a number of years. Their outperformance may be difficult to maintain in an environment in which U.S. consumers struggle to regain their old swagger.