11月30日，国际货币基金组织邀请人民币加入国际储备货币，并于2016年10月生效。中国立志在二十年内成为可靠的全球支付货币，而国际货币基金组织的批准则成为了重要的里程碑。但各国央行暂时不会大量买入人民币。
在各国央行7.8万亿美元的外汇储备中，人民币仅占1%。瑞士信贷预测，在未来的两年中，央行的人民币储备极有可能增加到1500亿美元至2000亿美元，但超过7800亿美元的可能性很低。这样一来，人民币将达到外汇储备总额的2.5%-3%，
央行行长们不愿意立刻开始囤积人民币的原因有很多。首先，他们没有义务这样做。国际货币基金组织将人民币纳入特别提款权货币篮子，流入国家的资金构成了外汇储备，而国家可以同他国央行交换特别提款权的货币，或是偿还货币基金组织的债务。央行可以依据特别提款篮子还分配外汇储备，但也不是必须这样做，实际情况是，他们很少这样做。
央行更倾向于按照实际需求来分配外汇储备的比例。今年九月，人民币成为第五大全球支付货币，占全球交易总量的2.5%。瑞士信贷预测，该数据会在2016年出现小幅增长，人民币支付将达到全球交易的3%，人民币的外汇储备将接近3%，而达不到其他分析家所预测的两位数。
中央银行更愿意持有最大交易伙伴的货币，但却不愿意依照同中国交易量的比例来储备人民币。那是因为同中国的贸易往来只有30%是用人民币结算的，而同美国的贸易往来有90%用美元结算，同日本则为70%。
央行行长们愿意储备货币来偿还外债，但是中国只占国际债券的0.6%，而国际银行的负债则更低。随着中国建立亚投行并提出“一带一路”的投资主题，这些数字会逐渐增加，但短期内不会出现明显的增长。
央行行长们必须对货币本身的价值进行评估。一方面，自2010年以来，人民币相对大多数货币升值，而瑞士信贷认为中国的财政盈余、低通胀率和较高的经济增速都将推动人民币进一步升值。另一方面，大量持有人民币会有很高的风险，因为中国的固定收益和货币市场的流通性很低。今年夏天，中国放宽了外国投资者进入境内债券市场的要求，但交易量仍然很低。政府债券也是如此，国有银行贡献了80%的交易量。就货币市场本身而言，虽然政府在今年八月允许市场决定人民币汇率，但政府仍频频加以干涉。瑞士信贷称，各国央行不愿意增加人民币外汇储备是害怕中国政府突然中止人民币或债券的交易。
央行对人民币保持警惕的另一个原因是对中国财政系统的不信任，这也是特别提款权将长期影响的地方。加入特别提款篮子意味着中国要允许他国央行“随意使用”人民币。瑞士信贷认为，国际货币基金组织的认可会增加私人投资者投资中国债券市场的信心。瑞士信贷认为，货币储备状况将推动资本市场的开放并促使财务系统更加透明。正是这类改革促使基金组织批准人民币入篮，而多年来中国力求在全球金融舞台上谋得一席之地，因此，中国也不愿意破坏刚刚到手的局面。
Reserved: What Next for the Renminbi?
On November 30, the International Monetary Fund invited the renminbi to join the pound, euro, U.S. dollar, and yen in an exclusive club of international reserve currencies starting in October 2016. China has been working to make its currency a credible global player for at least two decades, and the nod from the IMF is a significant symbolic victory. Still, don’t expect central banks to scoop up mass quantities of renminbi just yet.
Central banks currently hold only about one percent of their $7.8 trillion in foreign exchange reserves in renminbi. Credit Suisse thinks banks will add somewhere between $150 billion and $200 billion worth of the Chinese currency to their stockpiles over the next two years, with an outside chance of substantially more, up to $780 billion or so. That would bring the renminbi up to just 2.5 percent to 3 percent of total reserves, but capital inflows into China from central bank governors diversifying their holdings by adding renminbi would be useful in other ways – namely by offsetting China’s accelerating outflows and reducing the risk of another devaluation like the one in August.
There are a number of reasons central bankers are unlikely to be loading up on Chinese currency right away. For starters, they have no obligation to do so. The IMF included the renminbi in the basket of currencies that comprise its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) reserve asset, which the fund issues to countries to shore up their reserves. Countries can exchange SDRs for a reserve currency, trade them with other central banks, or use them to repay IMF debt. Central banks could base their reserve holdings on the weighting of the SDR basket, but they don’t have to, and in practice they rarely do.
Central bankers also tend to maintain currency reserves in proportion to their actual use. The renminbi was the fifth most used currency in the world in September, accounting for 2.5 percent of global transactions. In 2016, Credit Suisse sees a slight increase, estimating that 3 percent of global transactions will take place in renminbi – in line with their prediction that the currency will only rise to about 3 percent of total reserves, rather than the double-digit proportions other analysts have predicted.
Central banks also favor maintaining reserves of the currencies of their biggest trading partners, but they aren’t likely to hold renminbi in direct proportion to Chinese trade volumes. That’s because China settles just 30 percent of its trade in renminbi, compared to the 90 percent of American trade settled in dollars and 70 percent of Japanese trade in yen.
Central bankers do keep currencies around to pay down foreign debts, but China accounts for just 0.6 percent of international debt securities and an even lower proportion of international banking liabilities. With China leading the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure program, those numbers will eventually increase – but not for several years.
Central bankers also have to assess the merits of the currency itself. On one hand, the renminbi has appreciated significantly against most other currencies since 2010, and Credit Suisse believes China’s strong current account surplus, low inflation, and relatively high growth means it will continue doing so. On the other hand, there are risks to holding large quantities of renminbi, as both the fixed income and currency markets in China are relatively illiquid. China allowed foreign investors easier access to the onshore bond market this summer, but trading levels are still very low. In government bonds, too, state banks account for 80 percent of daily trading. In the currency markets themselves, while the government allowed market forces to play a larger role in determining the renminbi’s value this August, policymakers still intervene frequently. Credit Suisse says central banks have been reluctant to increase their renminbi holdings for fear that the government might suddenly halt trading in either the currency or Chinese bonds.
This last reason that central banks may remain wary of the renminbi – skepticism about the Chinese financial system – is where the SDR may have long-lasting effects. Inclusion in the SDR obligates China to allow other central banks to “freely use” the currency, and Credit Suisse believes the IMF stamp of approval may give more private investors the confidence to venture into Chinese debt markets. Credit Suisse believes that reserve-currency status will encourage official reforms that further open the capital account and make the financial system more transparent. It was reforms of that exact sort that played a key role in the IMF’s decision to add the renminbi to the SDR, and after years of vying for a spot on the global financial stage, China seems unlikely to want to jeopardize its newfound status.
本文翻译由兄弟财经提供
本文来源：https://www.thefinancialist.com/reserved-what-next-for-the-renminbi/#sthash.68pXnpPa.dpuf